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MISSING THE FOREST FOR THE TREES: WHY SUPPLEMENTAL 
NEEDS TRUSTS SHOULD BE EXEMPT FROM MEDICAID 
DETERMINATIONS
JEFFREY R. GRIMYSER*
INTRODUCTION
Imagine a middle-aged man who recently suffered from a stroke, caus-
ing him severe brain trauma. His disability is permanent, so he now lives in 
a nursing home and needs frequent medical assistance. He has no income 
because he can no longer work, but through Medicaid, his state helps him 
out—paying for his health care because his assets are low enough to quali-
fy him for the program.1 Later, his family decides to place his limited as-
sets in a trust, the purpose of which is to have Medicaid continue to pay for 
his medical needs, but have the trust pay for items that Medicaid will not 
cover, such as books, television, internet, travel, clothing, and toiletries.2
Under the law of the state where the man lives, he becomes ineligible 
for Medicaid when the trust is established. The policy behind the state law 
is to prevent individuals who receive Medicaid from spending their availa-
ble assets on non-medical needs. This law is especially critical now, as the 
state has huge budget deficit issues partly because of increasing Medicaid 
enrollment and expenditures.3
In 1993, Congress enacted several trust provisions within the Omnibus 
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA)4 to prevent individuals from 
sheltering their assets in trusts while receiving Medicaid.5 OBRA has a 
default rule that broadly mandates that income and assets contained in most 
*.I would like to thank Professor Mary F. Radford of Georgia State University College of Law for her 
substantive assistance on this issue. Additionally, many thanks to Elizabeth, the love of my life, and to 
all of my family for their support during law school.
1. See Ark. Dep’t. of Health & Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268, 275 (2006).
2. See, e.g., Lewis v. Alexander, 685 F.3d 325, 333 (3d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 933 
(2013).
3. For example, during the recent recession, roughly from 2007 to 2009, national Medicaid 
monthly enrollment increased by nearly six million and spending increased by thirteen percent. See
JOHN HOLAHAN ET AL., KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, MEDICAID SPENDING 
GROWTH OVER THE LAST DECADE AND THE GREAT RECESSION, 2000-2009, at 1 (2011), available at 
http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/8152.pdf. 
4. Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312 (1993) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1399 
(2003)).
5. See infra Part III.C.
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types of trusts be counted when a state Medicaid agency determines a per-
son’s Medicaid eligibility.6 But OBRA contains a narrow exception to the 
default rule for special needs trusts or supplemental needs trusts (SNTs),7
so called because they supplement a person’s Medicaid by paying for items 
not covered by Medicaid.8 Thus, under federal law it is clear that the de-
fault rule does not apply to SNTs; however, 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4) fails 
to indicate what laws states may enact to regulate SNTs.
SNTs are relatively unknown tools for individuals with disabilities to 
receive Medicaid without “impoverish[ing] themselves,” but “there is a 
long list of potential stumbling blocks” to use them.9 To begin, the trust 
must meet the elements for one of the three types of SNTs listed in the
Medicaid statute.10 Additionally, the trust provisions have confused federal 
courts, causing a recent circuit split about whether assets contained within 
SNTs can be counted by state Medicaid agencies when they determine the 
trust beneficiaries’ Medicaid eligibility and benefits.11 On one hand, one 
can read § 1396p(d)(4) as being mandatory, which would require all states 
to exempt assets in SNTs when determining Medicaid eligibility. This 
would allow the beneficiaries to continue using SNTs and remain eligible 
for Medicaid, but would force the states, as payors, to cover more citizens 
under Medicaid. On the other hand, one can interpret § 1396p(d)(4) as be-
ing optional, which would permit each state to enact laws that disqualify 
beneficiaries of SNTs from receiving Medicaid. This would enable states to 
save some of their limited resources, but would cause the beneficiaries to 
lose their Medicaid benefits if they use SNTs.
This Note argues that § 1396p(d)(4) is best read as being mandatory 
on the states based on the applicable statutory interpretation tools. This 
issue has widespread implications because Medicaid is extremely important 
to the health of many indigent people. For instance, a recent study showed 
that expanding Medicaid eligibility has the potential to “significant[ly] 
6. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(3) (2006). Note, however, that use of the phrase “default rule” in 
this Note is merely referring to a descriptive term to show that § 1396p(d)(3) applies to nearly all trusts, 
rather than referring to the contract law term of art. See, e.g., Lewis, 685 F.3d at 333 (stating that in 
§ 1396p(d)(3) “Congress established a general rule that trusts would be counted as assets for the pur-
pose of determining Medicaid eligibility.”).
7. See § 1396p(d)(4).
8. Mary F. Radford & Clarissa Bryan, Irrevocability of Special Needs Trusts: The Tangled Web 
That Is Woven When English Feudal Law Is Imported into Modern Determinations of Medicaid Eligi-
bility, 8 NAT’L ACAD. ELDER L. ATT’YS J. 1, 2 (2012). These trusts are also known as “special needs 
trusts” because they are generally used for individuals with special needs. See id. at 2-7.
9. Tara Siegel Bernard, What’s a Pooled Trust? A Way to Avoid the Nursing Home, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 4, 2010, at F4.
10. See infra Part I.C.
11. See infra Part II.
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decrease” mortality rates of those eligible for Medicaid.12 Federal legisla-
tion requiring states to pay for health care also touches upon state concerns 
over federalism.13 However, this Note argues that individuals with SNTs 
should be eligible for Medicaid because the SNTs were designed to sup-
plement Medicaid, not prevent a person from receiving Medicaid.
Part I briefly explains the Medicaid statute, SNTs, and the OBRA 
amendments. Part II explains the circuit split and examines each circuit’s 
use of the statutory interpretation tools. Part III analyzes those tools to in-
terpret § 1396p(d)(4), including the text, the legislative history, the Su-
preme Court precedent, and the agency interpretation. This Note then 
argues that § 1396p(d)(4) is best read as being mandatory on the states 
based on the purpose of the Medicaid statute and the structure of 
§ 1396p(d). Finally, Part IV claims that the provision should be mandatory 
also based on policy considerations, including assisting the beneficiaries
with disabilities, rejection of the states’ “sheltering assets” complaints, and 
creating a uniform interpretation of § 1396p(d)(4).
I. BACKGROUND OF MEDICAID, SUPPLEMENTAL NEEDS TRUSTS, AND 
OBRA
A. The Medicaid Statute
In 1965, Congress established Medicaid under Title XIX of the Social 
Security Act.14 Enacted in response to national concerns over citizens’ lack 
of affordable health care and rising medical costs,15 Medicaid was designed 
to help individuals without the financial resources obtain necessary medical 
care through medical assistance plans.16 It quickly became the primary 
federal program for providing medical care to indigent people through pub-
lic funding.17
12. Benjamin D. Sommers, Katherine Baicker & Arnold M. Epstein, Mortality and Access to Care 
Among Adults After State Medicaid Expansions, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1025, 1029 (2012) (discussing 
study showing mortality rates decreased over a five-year period in three states that expanded Medicaid 
eligibility in comparison to neighboring states that did not).
13. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2607 (2012) (holding that the 
mandatory nature of the Medicaid expansion program under the Affordable Care Act was unconstitu-
tional because Congress was “not free to . . . penalize States that choose not to participate in that new 
program by taking away their existing Medicaid funding”).
14. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (1965) (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1965)). Further, Medicaid was enacted under Congress’ Spending Clause 
authority. Lewis v. Alexander, 685 F.3d 325, 331-32 (3d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 933 (2013).
15. See Radford & Bryan, supra note 8, at 5.
16. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 301 (1980).
17. Mem’l Hosp. v. Maricopa Cnty., 415 U.S. 250, 262 n.19 (1974).
442 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 89:1
As of 2012, Medicaid was the nation’s largest public health insurer, 
with a population exceeding fifty-five million.18 As a joint state and federal 
program, Medicaid had a combined federal-state cost of $400 billion per 
year.19 To participate in the Medicaid program and receive federal funding, 
a state must have its medical assistance plan approved by the Secretary of 
the United States Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).20 On 
average, Medicaid spending accounts for twenty percent of a state’s overall 
budget, with the federal government funding about fifty to eighty-three 
percent of those costs.21
States may choose whether to participate in the Medicaid program,22
but the federal government encourages them to opt in to the program by 
providing financial incentives.23 If a state chooses to participate, then it 
must comply with the federal regulations promulgated by the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), which is a subdivision of the 
HHS.24 In practice, all fifty states have joined the Medicaid program.25 As 
long as the state’s Medicaid plan complies with the federal regulations, the 
state Medicaid agency is responsible for the day-to-day administration and 
supervision of the program.26 This in turn allows each state to customize 
their Medicaid programs while limiting costs.
To become eligible for Medicaid individuals must have “income and 
resources [that] are insufficient to meet the cost of necessary medical ser-
vices.”27 Medicaid is generally given to two groups of individuals: the 
categorically needy, who qualify for public assistance under the Supple-
mental Security Income program (SSI) or other federal programs designed 
to assist low-income groups;28 and the medically needy, who meet the non-
financial eligibility requirements of the categorically needy, but whose 
18. John D. Blum & Gayland O. Hethcoat II, Medicaid Governance in the Wake of National 
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius: Finding Federalism’s Middle Pathway, from Adminis-
trative Law to State Compacts, 45 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 601, 610 (2012). Note that this figure does not 
account for the recent Affordable Care Act expansion. Id.
19. Id. at 611.
20. Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204, 1208 (2012).
21. Nat’l. Fed’n. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2604 (2012).
22. Ark. Dep’t. of Health & Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268, 275 (2006).
23. See, e.g., Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2604. 
24. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. at 275. Note that the CMS was previously known as the Health Care Fi-
nancing Administration. Id. at 275 n.3.
25. Moore ex rel. Moore v. Reese, 637 F.3d 1220, 1232 (11th Cir. 2011).
26. Reynolds v. Giuliani, 506 F.3d 183, 188 (2d Cir. 2007).
27. Univ. of Wash. Med. Ctr. v. Sebelius, 634 F.3d 1029, 1031 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396-1 (2006)).
28. Pharma. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 651 n.4 (2003) (citing 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i) (2006)).
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income or assets are too high to qualify them as categorically needy.29
Once a state has opted in to the Medicaid program, it must provide assis-
tance to the categorically needy, but may provide coverage to the medically 
needy.30
B. Supplemental Needs Trusts
A trust is generally a legal instrument where assets are held in the 
name of the trust and managed by a trustee for the benefit of a benefi-
ciary.31 Because the beneficiary does not own the assets in the trust, but has 
an equitable right to use them, he or she may use the trust to avoid certain 
legal requirements.32
Supplemental needs trusts are a narrow category of trusts that help in-
dividuals with severe and chronic disabilities pay for items and services 
that Medicaid will not cover.33 This includes additional health care services 
and equipment, specialized or unique therapy, private health insurance, 
educational and vocational training, computers and software, case man-
agement services, and recreational activities.34 SNTs are commonly used 
where a person with a disability receives a “‘lump sum’ of money from a 
lawsuit, inheritance, or other source.”35 The typically modest assets in 
SNTs range from $10,000 to $150,000.36
C. OBRA and § 1396p(d)(4)
In 1993, President Bill Clinton signed into law the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1993.37 Before OBRA, no federal law mentioned 
29. Id. at 651 n.5 (citing § 1396a(a)(10)(C).
30. Schweiker v. Hogan, 457 U.S. 569, 572 (1982).
31. Lewis v. Alexander, 685 F.3d 325, 332 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
1546 (8th ed. 2004)), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 933 (2013). Similarly, the Medicaid statute defines a trust 
as “any legal instrument or device that is similar to a trust but includes an annuity only to such extent 
and in such manner as the Secretary [of the HHS] specifies.” § 1396p(d)(6).
32. Lewis, 685 F.3d at 332.
33. See Sullivan v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 174 F.3d 282, 284 (2d Cir. 1999). Note that third-party trusts, 
in contrast to special needs trust, are established with a third party’s assets and OBRA does not regulate 
them, so they are not the subject of this Note. See Bradley J. Frigon & W. Eric Kuhn, Which SNT, When 
& Why, 5 NAT’L. ACAD. OF ELDER L. ATT’YS J. 1, 7 (2009).
34. See Joseph A. Rosenberg, Supplemental Needs Trusts for People with Disabilities: The Devel-
opment of A Private Trust in the Public Interest, 10 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 91, 95-96 (2000). For a more 
comprehensive list of goods and services that beneficiaries may use SNTs to pay for, see Ruthann P. 
Lacey & Heather D. Nadler, Special Needs Trusts, 46 FAM. L. Q. 247, 260-61 (2012).
35. Rosenberg, supra note 34, at 95. 
36. Rosenberg, supra note 34, at 97 n.27 (collecting cases).
37. Ira Stewart Wiesner, Obra ‘93 and Medicaid: Asset Transfers, Trust Availability, and Estate 
Recovery Statutory Analysis in Context, 19 NOVA L. REV. 679, 681 (1995).
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SNTs because only state laws regulated them.38 OBRA was enacted partly 
in response to the states’ budgetary crises caused by individuals abusing 
Medicaid eligibility rules by hiding their assets in trusts to remain eligible 
for Medicaid39 or to provide an inheritance to their children and family.40
Yet, OBRA significantly changed whether individuals could use trusts 
while remaining eligible for Medicaid.41 In 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(3), Con-
gress created a default rule: assets in a trust are considered available to the 
individual, such that the state must count them when determining the indi-
vidual’s Medicaid eligibility.42 This rule is unquestionably mandatory on 
the states based on the statute’s text.43
In § 1396p(d)(1) and (4), however, Congress created a “limited excep-
tion” for SNTs: the default rule does not apply if a beneficiary uses an 
SNT.44 Specifically, § 1396p(d)(1) states, “subject to [§ 1396p(d)(4)], the 
[default] rules . . . shall apply” to Medicaid eligibility and benefits determi-
nations.45 Section 1396p(d)(4) then states that the default rule “shall not 
apply to any of the following [SNTs].”46 As previously noted, 
§ 1396p(d)(4) only states that the default rule does not apply to SNTs, but 
fails to note what rules may apply to SNTs. This lack of guidance has 
caused confusion among the courts and thus, the circuit split.
Further, Section 1396p(d)(4) lists three types of SNTs: individual, in-
come, and pooled.47 Because courts and scholars have referred to individu-
al SNTs as special needs trusts,48 to avoid confusion this Note will refer to 
each SNT by the above names and all three trusts collectively as SNTs. All 
three SNTs receive similar legal protection under OBRA, but there is a key 
38. Hobbs ex rel. Hobbs v. Zenderman, 542 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1231 n.11 (D.N.M. 2008), aff’d,
579 F.3d 1171 (10th Cir. 2009).
39. Wiesner, supra note 37, at 682-83.
40. Radford & Bryan, supra note 8, at 5-6.
41. Wiesner, supra note 37.
42. See Sai Kwan Wong v. Doar, 571 F.3d 247, 252 (2d Cir. 2009) (“In general, § 1396p(d)(3) 
requires a state, in the course of determining whether an individual is eligible for Medicaid, to consider 
assets placed in a trust by an individual seeking Medicaid benefits.”).
43. See, e.g., Keith v. Rizzuto, 212 F.3d 1190, 1193 (10th Cir. 2000) (“Section 1396p(d)(3) does 
not merely ‘allow’ states to count trusts in determining Medicaid eligibility; it requires them to do so.”)
(emphasis in original).
44. Doar, 571 F.3d at 252.
45. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(1) (2006).
46. § 1396p(d)(4).
47. See § 1396p(d)(4)(A)-(C).
48. See, e.g., Reames v. Okla. ex rel. Okla. Health Care Auth., 411 F.3d 1164, 1166 (10th Cir. 
2005).
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distinction in who receives each type of trust’s remaining assets once the 
beneficiary dies.49
Individual SNTs enable people with disabilities to contribute their 
own assets to pay for certain items.50 The essential elements are: (1) the 
beneficiary is disabled as defined under SSI; (2) the beneficiary is under 
age sixty-five; (3) the trust was established for the beneficiary’s benefit; (4) 
the trust was established by the beneficiary’s parent, grandparent, or legal 
guardian, or by a court; and (5) the trust includes a payback provision, 
which allows the state to be repaid with the remaining assets in the trust 
when the beneficiary dies, up to the amount of total medical assistance paid 
previously by the state to the beneficiary.51
Income SNTs (or “Miller trusts”)52 allow individuals living in nursing 
homes to qualify for Medicaid in a state that has an income cap for Medi-
caid eligibility.53 The essential elements are: (1) the trust was established 
for the beneficiary’s benefit; (2) the trust consists of only the beneficiary’s 
unearned income, which includes pensions, Social Security, and other ac-
cumulated income; (3) the trust includes a payback provision; and (4) the 
beneficiary resides in a state that does not have a medically needy program 
for nursing facility services.54
Pooled SNTs are for beneficiaries with lower incomes, but unlike in-
dividual SNTs, these beneficiaries have pooled their resources together into 
one trust to allow a non-profit organization to manage the trust and to re-
duce overhead expenses.55 The essential elements are: (1) the beneficiary is 
disabled under SSI; (2) the trust was established and is managed by a non-
profit organization; (3) each beneficiary’s trust account was established for 
the beneficiary’s benefit; (4) each trust account is kept separately; (5) each 
trust account was established by the beneficiary’s parent, grandparent, or 
legal guardian, or by a court; and (6) the trust may pay back to the state any 
assets remaining in the beneficiary’s account after his or her death, up to 
the amount of total medical assistance paid previously by the state to the 
49. That is not to suggest that the other distinctions between the SNTs are not crucial for the 
parties or courts dealing these issues; however, these distinctions are not as relevant to this Note’s topic 
of whether § 1396p(d)(4) should be read as being mandatory or optional on the states.
50. Reames, 411 F.3d at 1168.
51. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4)(A) (2006). For the definition of disabled, see 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1382c(a)(3)(A) (2006).
52. Note that these types of trusts are called “Miller trusts” based on a federal district court case. 
See Miller v. Ibarra, 746 F. Supp. 19 (D. Colo. 1990).
53. J.P. v. Div. of Med. Assistance & Health Servs., 920 A.2d 707, 711 n.3 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2007).
54. § 1396p(d)(4)(B). For further discussion of income SNTs, see Wiesner, supra note 37, at 721-
34.
55. Lewis v. Alexander, 685 F.3d 325, 333 (3d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 933 (2013).
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beneficiary.56 Regarding this final element, unlike individual and income 
SNTs, pooled SNTs are not required to include a payback provision be-
cause the trust may keep the remaining assets.57
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
Since 2000, four federal circuits have considered whether 
§ 1396p(d)(4) is mandatory on the states, and therefore whether SNTs must 
be exempt from Medicaid eligibility and benefit determinations.58 If an 
individual creates an SNT in the Second59 or Tenth Circuit,60 then the pro-
vision is optional. These circuits have relied mostly on the lack of clear 
statutory language requiring states to follow § 1396p(d)(4) and agency 
interpretation. If, instead, the individual creates the exact same SNT in the 
Third61 or Eighth Circuit,62 then the provision is mandatory. These circuits 
have placed greater weight on the purpose of the Medicaid statute and the 
structure of § 1396p(d).
A. The Second and Tenth Circuits: § 1396p(d)(4) is Optional on the States
In 2000, the Tenth Circuit, in Keith v. Rizzuto,63 addressed whether 
states must follow § 1396p(d)(4) when an individual places pension funds 
into an income SNT. In that case, a man with dementia associated with 
Alzheimer’s disease resided in a nursing home facility, where he likely 
would remain for the rest of his life.64 Both he and his wife’s only sources 
56. § 1396p(d)(4)(C).
57. Lewis, 685 F.3d at 349.
58. Note that nearly all of these circuits have analyzed § 1396p(d)(4) through claims brought 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a claim requiring the plaintiff to show that a federal statute “unambiguously 
impose[d] a binding obligation on the States.” Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 341 (1997). Be-
cause Medicaid contains no “federal enforcement mechanism” for individuals denied benefits, individ-
uals may sue the state Medicaid agencies under Section 1983 for violations of the Medicaid statute. 
Nicole Huberfeld, Bizarre Love Triangle: The Spending Clause, Section 1983, and Medicaid Entitle-
ments, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 413, 416-17 (2008). Here, the issue over whether § 1396p(d)(4) is man-
datory on the states comes into play because § 1983 requires the trust beneficiaries to show that they 
had standing to sue the state Medicaid agencies by asking: (1) whether Congress “intended” that the 
statute benefit the plaintiff; (2) whether the right is too “vague and amorphous that . . . [it] would strain 
judicial competence”; and (3) whether the statute “unambiguously imposed a binding obligation on the 
States.” Blessing, 520 U.S. at 340-41 (emphasis added).
59. See Sai Kwan Wong v. Doar, 571 F.3d 247 (2d Cir. 2009)
60. See Hobbs ex rel. Hobbs v. Zenderman, 579 F.3d 1171 (10th Cir. 2009); Reames v. Okla. ex
rel. Okla. Health Care Auth., 411 F.3d 1164 (10th Cir. 2005); Keith v. Rizzuto, 212 F.3d 1190 (10th 
Cir. 2000).
61. See Lewis v. Alexander, 685 F.3d 325 (3d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 933 (2013).
62. See Ctr. for Special Needs Trust Admin., Inc., v. Olson, 676 F.3d 688 (8th Cir. 2012).
63. 212 F.3d at 1190.
64. Id. at 1191.
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of income were his civil service and Veteran’s Administration pensions.65
After applying for Medicaid, he created an income SNT to prevent his pen-
sions from disqualifying him from Medicaid.66 But the state’s Medicaid 
regulations allowed individuals to establish SNTs only if their monthly 
incomes fell short of the average cost of nursing home care in the region 
where they reside.67 The state Medicaid agency denied the man’s Medicaid 
application because his monthly pension income was above his region’s 
average.68 In response, he sought declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 
U.S.C. § 198369 arguing that the state regulations were invalid for two 
reasons.70 First, he argued that the state was barred from denying his Medi-
caid application based on the structure of § 1396p(d)—specifically, since 
§ 1396p(d)(3) requires states to follow the default rule, and § 1396p(d)(4) 
exempts SNTs from the default rule, then § 1396p(d)(4) must also be man-
datory.71 Second, he argued that the state regulation was preempted by 
§ 1396p(d) under the Supremacy Clause because he could not comply with 
both the state and federal laws.72
The Tenth Circuit rejected both of his arguments.73 First, it found that 
he had “misapprehend[ed] the mandatory” nature of the Medicaid trust 
provisions.74 The court agreed with him that states must follow the default 
rule, but § 1396p(d)(4) is precatory because it is only “an exception to a 
requirement.”75 The court found that based on the clear legislative purpose 
and text, states are “free to decide” whether to count assets in SNTs when 
determining an individual’s Medicaid eligibility.76 Second, his preemption 
argument was rejected because an individual could comply with both the 
state and federal laws by having a pension lower than the average monthly 
cost of nursing home care in his region.77
In Reames v. Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma Health Care Authority, the 
Tenth Circuit again analyzed § 1396p(d) in the context of whether Social 
65. Id.
66. Keith v. Rizzuto, 212 F.3d 1190, 1191 (10th Cir. 2000).
67. Id. at 1191-92.
68. Id. Specifically, his combined pensions created a gross income of $4,867 per month; however, 
his region’s average for nursing home care was $3,034 per month. Id. at 1191.
69. See Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 341 (1997) (discussing § 1983). 
70. Rizzuto, 212 F.3d at 1192.
71. Id. at 1193.
72. Keith v. Rizzuto, 212 F.3d 1190, 1193 (10th Cir. 2000).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. Additionally, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s motion to dismiss his complaint 
for failure to state a claim. See id. at 1193-94.
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Security income placed in an individual SNT is exempted from state Medi-
caid benefits determinations.78 In Reames, a woman with a disability living 
in a nursing home received Social Security Disability (SSD) benefits, her 
sole source of income.79 The SSD benefits were used almost entirely as co-
pay for her monthly nursing home bills.80 To prevent her SSD benefits 
from being used as co-pay, she applied for Medicaid and placed her SSD 
benefits in an individual SNT.81 She hoped that by doing so, Medicaid 
would pay for her nursing home care and the SNT would pay for her other 
items and services.82 The state Medicaid agency approved her application, 
but required the woman to still use her SSD benefits as co-pay for her nurs-
ing home care.83 The state Medicaid agency was following a federal Medi-
caid regulation governing co-pay that required it to reduce Medicaid 
payments to nursing homes in an amount equal to the individual’s income, 
which included SSD benefits.84 In response, the plaintiff requested recov-
ery for retroactive payments from the state for her past co-pay to the nurs-
ing home, and declaratory and injunctive relief to stop the state from 
forcing her to make any future co-pay to the nursing home.85
The Tenth Circuit first dismissed her request for retroactive payments 
under the Eleventh Amendment.86 In turning to the prospective remedies, 
the court examined the federal law’s “conflicting” mandates.87 On one 
hand, cross-references from § 1396p(d)(4) to the Social Security statute 
suggest that “assets” placed in SNTs, including SSD benefits, are shielded 
from Medicaid eligibility determinations.88 On the other hand, the Medi-
caid regulation requires states to reduce Medicaid payments to individuals 
78. 411 F.3d 1164 (10th Cir. 2005).
79. Id. at 1166.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. Specifically, the state Medicaid agency required her to pay $796 of her $846 SSD benefits 
to the nursing home as co-pay every month. Id.
84. Reames v. Okla. ex rel. Okla. Health Care Auth., 411 F.3d 1164, 1166 (10th Cir. 2005). Note 
that this portion of the court’s opinion is referencing 42 C.F.R. § 435.733(a)(1) (West 2012).
85. Id. at 1167.
86. Id. at 1167-68. First, the Eleventh Amendment, which precludes individuals from suing the 
state both directly and indirectly for recovery of money from the state treasury, barred her claims 
against the state agencies. Second, the Eleventh Amendment barred her claims against the individual 
officers because she named the state, not the officers, in her complaint. See id. at 1167-68.
87. Id. at 1169.
88. Id. at 1168-69. Specifically, individuals may contribute “assets” in SNTs without having them 
treated as countable for Medicaid purposes. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4)(A) (2006). Assets are defined as 
“all income and resources of the individual.” § 1396p(e)(1). For making Medicaid determinations, the 
Medicaid statute then refers to the Social Security statute. See § 1396p(e)(2). Finally, the Social Securi-
ty statute defines income as including governmental benefits, including SSD benefits. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1382(a) (2006).
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based on their SSD benefits.89 To resolve this conflict, the Tenth Circuit 
looked to the applicable agency’s interpretation.90
The State Medicaid Manual (SMM), in which the CMS fills gaps in 
the Medicaid statute,91 states that SSD benefits placed in an SNT are not 
counted when determining Medicaid eligibility, but are counted under 
“post-eligibility rules.”92 The post-eligibility rules state that once an indi-
vidual is found eligible for Medicaid the state must count SSD benefits 
when determining the amount of Medicaid benefits that the individual will 
receive.93 The plaintiff in Reames, however, argued that the SMM conflict-
ed with § 1396p(d)(1), which requires states to not count income in SNTs 
when determining both eligibility and the “amount of” Medicaid benefits.94
To resolve the issue, the Tenth Circuit decided what level of deference 
should be given to the SMM by applying the Supreme Court’s two-prong 
test under Chevron.95 First, whether Congress has spoken on the precise 
issue, which if it has should be given the full effect of law.96 Here, the spe-
cific issue was whether states were required to not count SSD benefits 
placed in an SNT when determining an individual’s co-pay.97 The Tenth 
Circuit found that, after mining through the “haphazard and complex” 
Medicaid statute, Congress had not addressed this precise question.98 Un-
der the second prong, the court should defer to the agency’s interpretation 
only if it is “‘reasonable’ and ‘based on a permissible construction of the 
statute.’”99 Here, the Tenth Circuit ruled that the SMM had properly fol-
lowed both the Medicaid and Social Security laws because the SMM 
shielded income other than SSD benefits from Medicaid’s post-eligibility 
rules.100 In other words, the SMM was consistent with federal law because 
it still provided “full protection” for other types of income funding SNTs,
89. Reames, 411 F.3d at 1168-69.
90. Id. at 1169.
91. See Sai Kwan Wong v. Doar, 571 F.3d 247, 253 (2d Cir. 2009).
92. Reames, 411 F.3d at 1169 (quoting CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., STATE 
MEDICAID MANUAL § 3259.7(C)(5)(b) (2012) [hereinafter “SMM”], available at
http://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Guidance/Manuals/Paper-Based-Manuals-Items/CMS0
21927.html).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1169 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(1)).
95. The Tenth Circuit also noted that in this case the Chevron test was “helpful,” but “not neces-
sarily dispositive.” Id. at 1170 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 
(1984)).
96. Reames v. Okla. ex rel. Okla. Health Care Auth., 411 F.3d 1164, 1170 (10th Cir. 2005) (citing 
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843).
100. Id. at 1171.
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but it included a “narrow carve[d]-out” exception for SSD benefits placed 
in SNTs.101 Additionally, the plaintiff’s argument was mistakenly based on 
a “tortured concatenation” of cross-references from § 1396p(d)(1) to the 
Social Security statute.102
Next, the plaintiff argued that by assigning her SSD benefits to her 
SNT through direct deposit, the SSD benefits “belonged to the trust,” not 
her, and the state could not count them when determining her co-pay.103
The Tenth Circuit rejected this argument based on the SMM, which ex-
empts income in SNTs from Medicaid benefit determinations only if the 
income “actually belongs to the trust and not the individual.”104 However, 
the court found that the plaintiff’s SSD benefits belonged to her as they had 
“pass[ed] through [her] hands before arriving” in her SNT.105 Moreover, 
the Social Security statute specifically prohibits transferring or assigning 
SSD benefits.106
In 2009, the Tenth Circuit, in Hobbs ex rel. Hobbs v. Zenderman,107
addressed whether § 1396p(d)(4) is mandatory on the states for an individ-
ual who transfers an injury settlement into an individual SNT.108 In Hobbs,
a six-year-old boy was involved in a severe car accident that left him with 
traumatic brain injuries and seizures requiring significant daily assis-
tance.109 Three years later, he received a large injury settlement agreement, 
of which $1.1 million was placed in an individual SNT.110 The trust’s cor-
pus was partially used to pay the boy’s mother in exchange for caring for 
him and to purchase assets for the family.111 After the boy had already 
begun receiving Supplemental Security Income and Medicaid benefits, the 
state Medicaid agency reviewed his SNT and determined that he was dis-
qualified from Medicaid for two reasons.112 First, the SMM required that 
the trust be used for the beneficiary’s “sole benefit,” not the benefit of his 
101. Id. at 1172-73.
102. Reames v. Okla. ex rel. Okla. Health Care Auth., 411 F.3d 1164, 1171 (10th Cir. 2005).
103. Id. at 1170 n.5.
104. Id. at 1170 (quoting SMM § 3259.7(B)(1)). 
105. Id. at 1171.
106. Id. at 1171 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 407(a) (2006)).
107. 579 F.3d 1171 (10th Cir. 2009).
108. Id. at 1175.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1175-76. Specifically, the trust agreement contained a provision that allowed the boy’s
mother to receive reasonable compensation for caring for him, so she was paid for dressing, monitoring, 
bathing, transporting, and training him. Id. at 1175. Additionally, the expenditures on family assets 
included a fifty percent interest in his family’s land and home, home furnishings, homeowner’s insur-
ance, home maintenance and improvement, and life insurance on the boy’s parents. Id. at 1175-76.
112. Id. at 1176. Additionally, the Social Security Administration ceased paying SSI to the boy 
because his resources were above the $2,000 limit. Id.
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family.113 Second, the state’s administrative code required that he only 
have $2,000 in “countable resources” to be eligible for Medicaid, but his 
trust far exceeded that amount.114 In response, his family argued that 
§ 1396p(d)(4) was mandatory on the states and thus, they were allowed to 
place the settlement in the SNT without him losing Medicaid eligibility.115
Proceeding under Section 1983, his family sought monetary damages, an 
injunction prohibiting the state Medicaid agency from treating the SNT as a 
countable resource, and declaratory relief holding that the SNT complies 
with § 1396p(d)(4).116
The Tenth Circuit held that § 1396p(d)(4) did not “unambiguously 
impose a binding obligation” on the states, and therefore the state could 
count the assets in his SNT when determining his Medicaid eligibility.117
The court acknowledged that “[a]lthough the statute might have been read” 
as being mandatory, “that construction [wa]s foreclosed by [its] opinion in 
Keith.”118 Also, because of Medicaid’s “extraordinarily complex set of 
interlocking” statutes and regulations, the Tenth Circuit owed the SMM 
deference because it was “consistent with statutory language, statutory 
purpose, and [was a] reasonable” interpretation of § 1396p(d)(4).119
Finally, in 2009, the Second Circuit weighed in on whether 
§ 1396p(d)(4) was mandatory on the states in Sai Kwan Wong v. Doar,120
which involved circumstances nearly identical to those addressed in 
Reames. In Wong, a middle-aged man with a permanent disability lived in a 
nursing home, and his sole source of income was SSD benefits.121 After
Medicaid partially paid for his nursing home care,122 the state Medicaid 
agency reduced his Medicaid benefits and required him to use his SSD 
113. Id. at 1176-77 (citing SMM § 3257(B)(6)).
114. Id. at 1176.
115. Id. at 1179.
116. Id. at 1177.
117. Id. at 1179 (quoting Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 341 (1997)). Additionally, the Tenth 
Circuit rejected the family’s arguments that other provisions within the Medicaid statute created manda-
tory obligations on the states because those provisions were not relevant to this case. See id. at 1181-83.
118. Id. at 1180.
119. Id. at 1187. Additionally, the Tenth Circuit affirmed that the boy’s substantive and procedural 
due process rights were not violated when the state counted the assets in his SNT. Id. First, the court 
rejected the substantive due process claim that the state had created unclear Medicaid standards because 
the state provided a sufficient standard for when determining Medicaid eligibility. Id. at 1184-87. 
Second, the boy’s procedural due process rights were not violated because he was provided with a fair 
hearing, represented by his counsel, and permitted to submit evidence to an administrative law judge. 
Id. at 1187.
120. 571 F.3d 247 (2d Cir. 2009).
121. Id. at 253.
122. Id. For example, the court noted that in May 2007, Medicaid paid $8,095.89 of his monthly 
nursing home bill, which exceeded $9,000.00 per month. Id.
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benefits to pay for his nursing home care based on post-eligibility rules 
under state law and the Medicaid regulations.123 To stop this, the plaintiff 
created an individual SNT and deposited the SSD benefits into the trust.124
The state Medicaid agency, however, still required him to use his SSD 
benefits to pay for his nursing home care based on the SMM.125 The SMM 
provision at issue—the same one at issue in Reames—requires states to not 
count income placed in an SNT, including SSD benefits, when determining 
Medicaid eligibility, but count them for post-eligibility determinations.126
In response, the plaintiff argued that the SMM was invalid because it 
conflicted with the text of § 1396p(d)(1) and (4), which exempts SNTs 
from eligibility and post-eligibility determinations.127 He also argued that 
the structure of § 1396p(d) had created a “negative command” for the 
states—specifically, since § 1396p(d)(3) was mandatory on the states, the 
rules in § 1396p(d)(4) must also be mandatory.128
To evaluate whether the SMM was invalid, the Second Circuit applied 
the two-prong Chevron test.129 First, the court held that there was ambigui-
ty as to what post-eligibility rules Congress intended with § 1396p(d)(1) 
and (4),130 as those two provisions do not “provide any guidance” to the 
state Medicaid agencies.131 Second, the court ruled that the SMM did not 
warrant Chevron deference because agency manuals generally do not merit 
such deference.132 However, the SMM did warrant Skidmore deference, 
123. Id. at 254. Specifically, the state calculated that his available income ($1,024.81) was almost 
exactly the same as his SSD benefits ($1,401.00). Id. at 253-54.
124. Id. at 254.
125. Id.
126. Sai Kwan Wong v. Doar, 571 F.3d 247, 253 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing SMM § 3259.7(C)(5)(b)).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 256-57. Before addressing these arguments, the Second Circuit “assumed” that the man 
had a private right of action under Section 1983 for “this appeal only” because his “claim on the merits”
was rejected. Id. at 254 n.9. The court then addressed the man’s additional arguments. First, the court 
held that his reliance on Sullivan v. Cnty. of Suffolk was misguided, as the “context” of the case made 
his argument “at best dictum.” Id. at 257. Second, the court rejected his argument that Congress intend-
ed to include SSD benefits as “assets” when individuals place them in SNTs, because the provisions he 
cited to only shield assets when individuals “create” SNTs, but say nothing about post-eligibility rules 
once the SNT has been created. Id. at 258. Finally, the man’s procedural challenge to the federal regula-
tion 42 C.F.R. § 435 was time-barred based on the Administrative Procedure Act’s rule that challenges 
to regulations expire six years after the issuance of a regulation. Id. at 263.
129. Id. at 255-56.
130. Id. at 256 n.11.
131. Id. at 257.
132. Id. at 258. However, the court did not foreclose the possibility that the SMM warranted Chev-
ron deference: according to the court, this issue “raise[d] an interesting question,” but the court was 
“content simply to rely on the agency’s concession that Skidmore” deference was warranted. Id. at 259. 
Nonetheless, the court hinted towards Chevron deference being inapplicable to the case. First, it noted 
that the Secretary of the HHS “has neither ‘produced regulations’ pursuant to” this congressional dele-
gation “nor ‘claimed’ Chevron deference for SMM [§] 3259.7.” Id. Additionally, the court had “recent-
ly observed, there are ‘few, if any, instances in which an agency manual, in particular, has been 
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which is a lower degree of deference than Chevron because it only provides 
“guidance” to the court133 but only “to the extent [that] it [is] persua-
sive.”134
After examining the text and structure of § 1396p(d)(4), the Second 
Circuit found that the SMM had properly filled the congressional gap for 
several reasons.135 First, § 1396p(d)(4) contained no “textual limit” on the 
scope of the CMS’s authority to make Medicaid eligibility and post-
eligibility determinations because Congress allows the CMS to fill the 
gap.136 Second, the SMM was “fully consistent” with other Medicaid pro-
visions that require individuals to contribute their available income to pay 
for their nursing home care.137 Third, the CMS had specifically claimed 
that the SMM was a binding interpretation of § 1396p(d)(4) and the provi-
sion is not ad hoc but applicable to everyone.138 Fourth, the relevant sec-
tion of the SMM was issued one year after OBRA’s enactment and had not 
changed since, which showed that it was consistently followed.139 Finally,
the only legal challenge to the SMM was in Reames, which the Tenth Cir-
cuit rejected.140
B. The Eighth and Third Circuits: § 1396p(d)(4) is Mandatory on the States
From 2000 to 2012, no federal circuit interpreting § 1396p(d)(4) held 
that it was optional on the states.141 The Eighth Circuit, however, created 
the circuit split when it determined that § 1396p(d)(4) was mandatory in 
the context of an individual using a pooled SNT. In Center For Special 
Needs Trust Administration, Inc., v. Olson,142 a man with a disability living 
in a nursing home transferred his money into a pooled SNT, and then ap-
plied for Medicaid.143 Because the state Medicaid agency was mistaken 
about his age, it did not apply state and federal laws limiting transfers of 
accorded Chevron deference.’” Id. at 258 (quoting Estate of Landers v. Leavitt, 545 F.3d 98, 106 (2d 
Cir. 2008)).
133. Id. at 250 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).
134. Id. at 256 (quoting Leavitt, 545 F.3d at 105).
135. Id. at 262. 
136. Id. at 260.
137. Id. at 261. 
138. Id. at 261-62.
139. Id. at 262.
140. Id.
141. Note that the Eighth Circuit evaluated the mandatory nature of § 1396p(d)(4), holding that a 
state Medicaid agency could impose a Medicaid lien on two women’s large personal injury settlements 
before the women placed the remaining funds in individual SNTs. Norwest Bank of North Dakota, 
N.A., v. Doth, 159 F.3d 328, 333 (8th Cir. 1998).
142. 676 F.3d 688 (8th Cir. 2012).
143. Id. at 693. Note that the court’s opinion does not indicate the source of the man’s money.
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assets to SNTs over a certain age.144 Medicaid then covered his nursing 
home care until his death, after which the state Medicaid agency discovered 
the error based on his age and demanded reimbursement from the non-
profit organization (the plaintiff) that had managed the pooled SNT.145 In 
response, the plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief under Sec-
tion 1983 to stop the state Medicaid agency from demanding reimburse-
ment.146
In a short explanation, the Eighth Circuit held that § 1396p(d)(4) im-
posed a mandatory obligation on the states because the first sentence of 
§ 1396p(d)(4) was “couched in mandatory terms.”147 Further, the court 
declined to apply the reasoning from Keith and Hobbs because the statute 
states that the default rule “shall not” apply to SNTs.148
Finally, in Lewis v. Alexander, the Third Circuit addressed whether 
§ 1396p(d)(4) was mandatory when a state enacts a law restricting the use 
of pooled SNTs.149 In Lewis, eleven of twelve individuals in a pooled trust 
(the beneficiaries) had disabilities and received Medicaid.150 To pay for 
items not covered by Medicaid, they placed their assets in pooled SNTs 
144. Id. at 693-94 (noting that the federal law required that individuals under age sixty-five who 
transfer assets into pooled SNTs to pay a penalty, and the state law disqualified individuals over age 
sixty-five from receiving Medicaid if they transfer assets to an SNT established solely for the benefit 
the individual).
145. Id. at 694.
146. Id. Before addressing these issues, the Eighth Circuit first held that pooled SNTs do not re-
quire a payback provision or place an age limit on the beneficiary. Id. at 695-96. Further, the court ruled 
that the plaintiff did have standing to sue the state Medicaid agency because the state could still apply 
state law to the plaintiff in the future. Id. at 696-97. Next, the court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that 
the state had waived its right for reimbursement by initially providing him benefits because, although it 
was a mistake, there was no proof that the state had waived any right. Id. at 698. Finally, the plaintiff’s
equitable estoppel claim was denied because the state’s mistake was not affirmative misconduct. Id.
147. Id. at 700. In addressing this issue, the court also held that the plaintiff had met the other two 
factors from the Blessing test: § 1396p(d)(4) clearly intended to benefit non-profit organizations be-
cause it was listed in the statute, and the right was not too vague or amorphous because beneficiaries 
must meet certain elements to use pooled SNTs. See id. at 699-700 (citing Blessing v. Freestone, 520 
U.S. 329, 340-41 (1997)).
148. Ctr. for Special Needs Trust Admin., Inc., v. Olson, 676 F.3d 688, 700 n.2 (8th Cir. 2012) 
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4) (2006)). Additionally, the court ruled that Congress has not fore-
closed Section 1983 enforcement of the Medicaid Act. Id.at 699-700. Finally, the court ruled that the 
plaintiff did have a private cause of action under Section 1983, but its claim was without merit and 
federal law did not preempt the state regulation. Id. at 700-03. Specifically, there was no conflict be-
tween the state’s regulations (requiring individuals using pooled SNTs to be under age sixty-five) and 
§ 1396p(d)(4) because Congress intended that individuals over age sixty-five using these trusts would 
still be subject to transfer penalty rules listed in § 1396p(c). Id.
149. 685 F.3d 325 (3d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 933 (2013).
150. Id. at 335. Specifically, only one beneficiary was not disabled or receiving Medicaid, but that 
beneficiary was the administratrix for the estate of her deceased niece, who was disabled and receiving 
Medicaid at the time of her death. Id. Additionally, two charitable organizations were also plaintiffs in 
this lawsuit: the first organization managed approximately $23 million in funds for its approximately 
117 pooled trust accounts, and the second managed approximately $20 million in funds for its approxi-
mately 1,122 pooled trust accounts. Id. at 335-36.
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that had generally “quite low” balances.151 Because their trusts did not 
comply with several provisions of a state law enacted to prevent sheltering 
assets, the state Medicaid agency sought to terminate some of the benefi-
ciaries’ Medicaid benefits.152 In response, the beneficiaries brought a class 
action suit, under both § 1983 and the Supremacy Clause, seeking injunc-
tive and declaratory relief to bar enforcement of the state law because it 
was preempted by § 1396p(d)(4).153
The central issue in the case was whether § 1396p(d)(4) created a 
mandatory obligation on the states.154 The state argued that § 1396p(d)(4) 
was optional based on the provision’s opening sentence: “This subsection
shall not apply to any of the following [SNTs].”155 According to the state, 
this sentence created a legislative “gap” because it did not proscribe what 
laws states may enact to regulate SNTs.156 In turn, this allowed the states to 
enact laws to fill that gap. Here, the state argued that if Congress intended 
that § 1396p(d)(4) be mandatory then it would have used clear obligatory 
language, such as these SNTs “shall not be counted as available assets for 
determining Medicaid eligibility.”157
The Third Circuit held that the first sentence of § 1396p(d)(4) had 
caused the Second and Tenth Circuits to “miss the forest for the trees.”158
Instead, the Third Circuit found that § 1396p(d)(4) imposed a mandatory 
obligation on the states based on the “text and structure of the Medicaid 
statute.”159 First, the Third Circuit wrote that Congress’ “choice of an im-
perative like ‘shall’” gave strong textual evidence that Congress did not 
intend to allow states to freely ignore § 1396p(d)(4).160 If, instead, the pro-
vision was intended to be optional, as the state claimed, then Congress 
could have used “[a]ny number of [other] constructions,” such as “States 
are not required to apply [§ 1396p(d)(4) to SNTs].”161
Second, the Third Circuit noted that courts must follow all of Con-
gress’ statutory objectives.162 Here, Congress had two purposes for 
151. Id. at 335 (most of the balances in the pooled SNTs were between a few hundred to a few 
thousand dollars).
152. Id. at 337.
153. Id. at 331.
154. Id. at 342. Before turning to this issue, the Third Circuit first held that the beneficiaries had 
constitutional standing, prudential standing, and a case that was not ripe. See id. at 338-42.
155. Id. at 342 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4)).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 343.
159. Id. at 344. 
160. Id. at 343.
161. Id.
162. Id. (citing Rodriguez v. U.S., 480 U.S. 522, 525-26 (1987)).
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§ 1396p(d): the primary goal was to broadly prevent individuals from shel-
tering their assets in trusts while remaining eligible for Medicaid, but the 
secondary goal was to exempt SNTs from Medicaid determinations.163
This small exception for SNTs allows individuals with disabilities to use 
SNTs to pay for necessities and comforts that would “rarely be considered 
extravagant.”164 Thus, Congress intended not “merely to shelter” SNTs 
from the default rule, but also “to shelter [them] from having any impact on 
Medicaid eligibility.”165
Third, the Third Circuit found that Congress made a “deliberate 
choice” to “expand the federal [government’s] role” in defining and regu-
lating SNTs with § 1396, after prior Medicaid statutes had failed to limit 
Medicaid abuse.166 Federal control over Medicaid was evidenced 
“throughout the Medicaid statute,” including 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(18), 
which requires states to comply with all of § 1396p.167 In effect, Congress 
had “set the boundaries for what will be considered a[n SNT].”168
Fourth, the Third Circuit found that the structure of Medicaid’s asset-
counting rules was the most important evidence of Congress’ intent.169 The 
default rule and § 1396p(d)(4) are part of a “complex and comprehensive 
system” that “rigorously dictates” what assets must count and not count 
towards Medicaid eligibility.170 By “actually legislating on this precise 
class of asset[s] . . . Congress intended to create a purely binary system of 
classification: either a trust affects Medicaid eligibility or it does not.”171
Therefore, the state was “not free to rewrite” § 1396p(d)(4).172
Because the beneficiaries had a private right under both Section 1983 
and the Supremacy Clause,173 the Third Circuit turned to whether the state 
law was preempted by § 1396p(d)(4). In this case, the court noted that 
OBRA was not intended to displace the states’ general trust laws;174 how-
ever, states must follow § 1396p(d)(4) and not impose any additional bur-
163. Lewis, 685 F.3d at 343.
164. Id. at 333. 
165. Id. at 343.
166. Id. For a discussion of some of these prior laws, see infra Part III.C.
167. Lewis v. Alexander, 685 F.3d 325, 343 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(18) 
(2006)), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 933 (2013).
168. Id. at 344.
169. Id. at 343.
170. Id. at 344.
171. Id. (emphasis omitted).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 345-46. Note that the Third Circuit held that the beneficiaries also had a private right 
under the Supremacy Clause because they presented a federal question in seeking injunctive relief from 
a state regulation. See id.
174. Id. at 347.
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dens on those requirements.175 In conclusion, the Third Circuit held that 
several provisions of the state’s law conflicted with § 1396p(d)(4) because 
“Congress intended that [SNTs] be defined by a specific set of criteria that 
it set forth,” not the states.176
III. ANALYSIS: APPLYING THE STATUTORY INTERPRETATION TOOLS
Interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4) has been difficult for the state 
Medicaid agencies and the federal circuits. Medicaid generally is an “ex-
traordinarily complex set of interlocking” statutes and regulations.177 As 
the Supreme Court stated, the Social Security Act’s “Byzantine construc-
tion . . . makes the Act ‘almost unintelligible to the uninitiated.’”178 Fur-
ther, the CMS has not issued any regulations for § 1396p(d).179
This Note will interpret the provision by first analyzing § 1396p(d) 
with each statutory interpretation tool. Statutory analysis of § 1396p(d)(4) 
must begin by observing the ordinary meaning of the statute’s language.180
Next, this Note examines the legislative history of OBRA, the Supreme 
Court’s precedent for § 1396p, and the agency interpretation. Finally, this 
Part collectively analyzes the tools to conclude that § 1396p(d)(4) is best 
read as being mandatory on the states based on the structure of § 1396p(d) 
and the purpose of the Medicaid statute.
A. The Text of § 1396p(d)
The relevant sections of § 1396p(d), titled “Treatment of trust amounts,” 
govern the relationship between SNTs and Medicaid determinations:
175. Id.
176. Id. at 347. Specifically, the Third Circuit held that § 1396p(d)(4) preempted four of the five 
state law provisions at issue in the appeal. First, the state law’s requirement that fifty percent of the 
pooled SNT be repaid to the state if the beneficiary dies was struck down because § 1396p(d)(4)(C) 
leaves it to the discretion of the trust. Id. at 348-49. Second, the state law’s requirement that all trust 
expenditures have a “reasonable relationship” to the beneficiary’s needs was preempted because 
§ 1396p(d)(4) contains no similar limitation. Id. at 350. Third, the state law’s restriction of pooled SNTs 
to beneficiaries only with “special needs that will not be met without the trust” and that “assist in and 
are related to the treatment of the beneficiary’s disability” was struck down because § 1396p(d)(4) only 
requires that the beneficiary be disabled. Id. at 350-51. Fourth, the state law’s restriction of pooled 
SNTs to beneficiaries only under age sixty-five was preempted because § 1396p(d)(4) contains no age 
restriction. See id. at 351-52. However, the state law’s enforcement provision—allowing the state 
Medicaid agency to petition a court for an order to terminate the trust—was upheld because it was part 
of the state’s retained authority to regulate trusts in the state. Id. at 352-53.
177. Hobbs ex rel. Hobbs v. Zenderman, 579 F.3d 1171, 1186 (10th Cir. 2009).
178. Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 43 (1981) (quoting Friedman v. Berger, 547 F.2d 
724, 727 n.7 (2d Cir. 1976)).
179. Ctr. for Special Needs Trust Admin., Inc., v. Olson, 676 F.3d 688, 700 (8th Cir. 2012). 
180. See, e.g., Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 2149, 2156 (2010) (“As in all 
such cases, we begin by analyzing the statutory language, assuming that the ordinary meaning of that 
language accurately expresses the legislative purpose.”).
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(1) For purposes of determining an individual’s eligibility for, or amount 
of, benefits under a State plan under this subchapter, subject to paragraph 
(4), the rules specified in paragraph (3) shall apply to a trust established 
by such individual.
. . .
(3) [States the default rule that the corpus of a trust “shall be considered 
resources available to the individual,” and that payments from the trust 
“shall be considered income of the individual.”]
(4) This subsection shall not apply to any of the following trusts:
(A) [Requirements for the individual SNTs.]
(B) [Requirements for the income SNTs.]
(C) [Requirements for the pooled SNTs.]181
B. Analysis of the Text
Because § 1396p(d)’s text is short and lacks sufficient guidance, it is 
partly at fault for the circuit split. The text clearly states that SNTs are ex-
empt from the default rule, but fails to indicate whether § 1396p(d)(4) is 
mandatory on the states. The Third and Eighth Circuits held that the word 
“shall” in both § 1396p(d)(1) and (4) means that the SNTs provisions are 
mandatory. In contrast, the Second and Tenth Circuits ruled that because 
the statute fails to indicate what rule applies when the default rule does not 
apply, each state may fill that gap as it chooses. For example, if a mother 
told her children to clean the house but said that this rule does not apply to 
her oldest child, those instructions do not inform the oldest child whether 
he or she must clean the house.
The Second and Tenth Circuits found that § 1396p(d) does not indi-
cate what rule must apply to SNTs, but this argument is weak because the 
text is ambiguous. If Congress had wanted to make § 1396p(d)(4) optional 
or mandatory, then it could have used clear language in § 1396p(d)(4), such 
as “For the following SNTs, the default rule is optional (or mandatory) on 
the States.” Thus, the text helps little in interpreting whether § 1396p(d)(4) 
is optional or mandatory on the states.
C. The Legislative History of § 1396p(d)(4)
Prior to § 1396p(d), 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(k) regulated the relationship 
between trusts and Medicaid eligibility, which attempted to stop Medicaid 
abuse by mandating that all assets in a “Medicaid Qualifying Trust” were 
181. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d) (2006). For a discussion of the specific elements of the SNTs, see supra
Part I.C.
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available to the beneficiary.182 However, Section 1396a(k) failed to stop 
Medicaid abuse, so Congress repealed the law and replaced it with 
§ 1396p(d) in 1993.183
One goal for § 1396p(d) was to place stricter requirements on 
trusts.184 Prior to § 1396p(d), trusts were viewed as the “single most offen-
sive Medicaid estate planning vehicle” because individuals could manipu-
late Medicaid eligibility requirements by hiding their assets in trusts.185
Additionally, states were having budgetary crises186 and more individuals 
were seeking Medicaid than Medicaid agencies had anticipated or were 
capable of serving.187 Thus, Congress wanted to close Medicaid’s eligibil-
ity “loopholes.”188
The Subcommittee on Health and the Environment of the House 
Committee on Energy and Commerce addressed this issue with hearings 
titled “Medicaid Budget Reconciliation.”189 The goal of the hearings was 
to eliminate $7.8 billion from the Medicaid budget within five fiscal 
years.190 Special interest groups such as the long-term care insurance in-
dustry and the state Medicaid agencies, both of which wanted to increase 
revenues and to reduce expenditures, mostly set the agenda for these hear-
ings.191 An important leader for the long-term insurance industry argued in 
front of the Subcommittee that non-poor, elderly persons were causing 
serious financial problems by hiding their assets in trusts.192 In contrast, the 
President of the National Academy of Elder Law Attorneys argued in front 
of the Subcommittee that allowing states to restrict the use of trusts would 
be “punishing” individuals with mostly limited assets.193
After the hearings, an amendment was proposed to fix the Medicaid 
eligibility issues, which was incorporated into the House Bill.194 As a re-
182. Ramey v. Reinertson, 268 F.3d 955, 958-59 (10th Cir. 2001). For a discussion of MQTs, see 
Rosenberg, supra note 34, at 130.
183. Ramey, 268 F.3d at 959. Note that this § 1396a(k) should not be confused with the same titled 
provision in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. 
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2601 (2012).
184. Ramey, 268 F.3d at 959. 
185. Wiesner, supra note 37, at 703.
186. Id. at 683.
187. Id. at 734.
188. Id. at 685.
189. Id. at 683-84.
190. Id. at 684.
191. Id. at 682.
192. Id. at 688-90.
193. Medicare and Medicaid Budget Reconciliation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health and 
the Env’t of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 426 (1993) (statement 
of Vincent J. Russo, President for National Academy of Elder Law Attorneys).
194. Wiesner, supra note 37, at 684 n.15.
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sult, individual and income SNT provisions were added to the bill,195 and
disability advocates successfully argued to include pooled SNTs.196 The 
Senate Bill included identical language as compared to the current rules in 
§ 1396p(d)(4), except that individual SNTs did not have an age require-
ment,197 though this requirement was later added.198 Congress did not re-
visit the SNT provisions again,199 and the final version of § 1396p(d) 
passed on August 10, 1993.200
D. Analysis of the Legislative History
The legislative history of OBRA and § 1396p(d)(4), which has been 
aptly referred to as “sparse,”201 offers little help to determine whether the 
provision is mandatory or optional on the states. In fact, none of the federal 
circuits even analyzed the legislative history of § 1396p(d)(4). One com-
mentator argued that there is a lack of congressional records because Medi-
caid amendments are “always among the final parts to be added to the huge 
budget reconciliation acts.”202 Regardless, both sides of the debates argued 
over how trusts should affect Medicaid eligibility. States and insurance 
industry representatives wanted more restrictions to stop abuse by all trusts, 
while disability advocates lobbied to keep legal protections for individuals 
with disabilities.203 Beyond that, there is no affirmative evidence in the 
legislative history to help interpret § 1396p(d)(4).
However, an argument could be made that the lack of legislative histo-
ry for SNTs shows that § 1396p(d)(4) should be mandatory on the states. 
Since Congress intended to close the Medicaid loopholes with OBRA,204
but SNTs were not part of the problem205 and there was no legislative his-
tory showing that Congress was particularly concerned with SNTs abusing 
Medicaid, it seems possible that Congress did not intend to restrict use of 
195. Rosenberg, supra note 34, at 129.
196. Id.
197. Wiesner, supra note 37, at 713 n.130.
198. Id. Disability advocates believed that including the age requirement for individual SNTs was a 
technical drafting error. Rosenberg, supra note 34, at 129.
199. Rosenberg, supra note 34, at 130.
200. Id. at 140.
201. Id. at 127 n.211. Further, one federal district court noted that to say there is little legislative 
history for § 1396p(d)(4) is an “understatement,” and that even the “[c]ourt’s own best efforts have 
uncovered no sign that Congress ever mentioned this provision in any published report.” Hobbs ex rel.
Hobbs v. Zenderman, 542 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1228 (D.N.M. 2008), aff’d, 579 F.3d 1171 (10th Cir. 
2009).
202. Rosenberg, supra note 34, at 128. 
203. Id. at 127.
204. Lewis v. Alexander, 685 F.3d 325, 343 (3d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 933 (2013).
205. Radford & Bryan, supra note 8, at 7.
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SNTs but instead only those trusts abusing Medicaid. Nonetheless, the 
legislative history (or lack thereof) is ultimately inconclusive about what 
Congress intended with § 1396p(d)(4).
E. The Supreme Court’s Precedent Regarding § 1396p
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed whether § 1396p(d)(4) 
is mandatory on the states, it has shed some light on how to interpret 
§ 1396p(d)(4). In Arkansas Department of Health & Human Services v. 
Ahlborn,206 the state Medicaid agency paid for medical assistance after a 
woman suffered severe injuries following a car accident.207 Later, the 
woman sued the tortfeasors who caused the accident seeking damages for 
her past medical expenses, permanent physical injuries, future medical 
expenses, past and present pain and suffering, and past and future loss of 
earnings.208 When both parties agreed to a settlement, the state Medicaid 
agency asserted a lien on the settlement seeking reimbursement for the total 
cost of payments made by the state for her care, even though only one-sixth 
of the settlement proceeds represented payments for her past medical ex-
penses.209 The legal issue was which of the parties’ “competing construc-
tions” of § 1396 was correct.210 The plaintiff argued that the state Medicaid 
agency was entitled to only the portion of the settlement that constituted 
reimbursement for past medical expenses.211 In contrast, the state Medicaid 
agency argued that it could demand reimbursement for the full amount of 
medical assistance that it paid.212
The Supreme Court held for the plaintiff based on the third-party lia-
bility and anti-lien provisions in the Medicaid statute.213 First, the text of 
the third-party liability provisions did not explicitly provide the state Medi-
caid agency with a right to collect for any expenses from liable third parties 
beyond past medical care.214 The Supreme Court ruled that the state Medi-
caid agency’s “reading ignore[d] the rest of the provision, which makes 
clear that the State” may only recover for past medical expenses.215 Sec-
206. 547 U.S. 268 (2006).
207. Id. at 272-73.
208. Id. at 273.
209. Id. at 274. Specifically, the tortfeasors settled with the woman for $550,000.00 and the state 
Medicaid agency claimed $215,645.30. Id.
210. Id. at 275.
211. Id. at 274.
212. Ark. Dep’t. of Health & Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268, 274 (2006).
213. Id. at 280.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 281 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(25)(H) (2006)).
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ond, the text of § 1396p(a), containing the anti-lien provisions, “[r]ead 
literally and in isolation,” prohibited states from placing liens against, or 
seeking recovery of benefits paid from, Medicaid recipients.216 Only re-
covery for past medical expenses was allowed because it was “expressly 
provided” for in the Medicaid statute.217
F. Analysis of the Supreme Court’s Precedent
Ahlborn did not address whether § 1396p(d)(4) is mandatory on the 
states.218 However, the Supreme Court’s analysis shows how § 1396p(d)(4) 
should be interpreted as being mandatory on the states. First, the Court 
ruled that the Medicaid statute should be viewed as a whole, not each pro-
vision in isolation.219 In Ahlborn, even though the state Medicaid agency’s 
reading of one sentence within the statute supported its conclusion, it had 
ignored the statute’s surrounding provisions protecting the Medicaid recip-
ient. Second, the Court concluded that the state Medicaid agency could 
recover portions of an individual’s assets only if a statute clearly provides 
the state with that right. There, the statute plainly allowed for recovery of 
past medical expenses, but not for recovery of future expenses or pain and 
suffering.
Here, both conclusions support interpreting § 1396p(d)(4) as being 
mandatory on the states. First, examining the first sentence of 
§ 1396p(d)(4) in isolation, as the state Medicaid agency did in Lewis,220
ignores the detailed definitions of SNTs and surrounding provisions in 
§ 1396p(d). As discussed below, the structure and purpose of § 1396p(d) 
show that Congress created a binary system of rules for SNTs and non-
SNTs.221 Second, state Medicaid agencies should not be allowed to deny 
Medicaid benefits unless a statute unambiguously confers that right, but as 
mentioned above, § 1396p(d)(4) is unclear as to whether the provision is 
mandatory. Further, in Ahlborn, the Court found that the relevant statutory 
language “place[d] express limits on the State’s powers” to seek recovery 
of funds from Medicaid beneficiaries.222 Similarly, the mandatory “shall” 
216. Id. at 284 (citing § 1396p(a)).
217. Id.
218. See id. at 289 (“Because the opinions in those cases address a different question from the one 
posed here . . . we conclude that they do not control our analysis.”).
219. See also K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988) (“In ascertaining the plain 
meaning of [a] statute, the court must look to the particular statutory language at issue, as well as the 
language and design of the statute as a whole.”).
220. Lewis v. Alexander, 685 F.3d 325, 342-43 (3d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 933 (2013).
221. See infra Part III.I.
222. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. at 283.
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language in § 1396p(d)(4) limits the state Medicaid agencies’ discretion 
regarding assets in SNTs affecting Medicaid eligibility by prohibiting them 
from applying the default rule.
G. The Agency Interpretation of SNT’s Affect on Medicaid
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) issues the 
State Medicaid Manual (SMM) to help state Medicaid agencies administer 
the program.223 The SMM contains “official interpretations of the law and 
regulations, and, as such, are binding on Medicaid State agencies.”224
While the SMM contains no provision stating whether § 1396p(d)(4) is 
mandatory or optional on the states, two provisions were at issue in the 
circuit split.225 First, the SMM’s requirement that the SNT be used for the 
sole benefit of the beneficiary states, “a trust is considered to be established 
for the sole benefit of a spouse, blind or disabled child, or disabled individ-
ual if the trust benefits no one but that individual.”226 Second, the SMM’s 
eligibility and post-eligibility rules state, “[i]ncome placed in a[n SNT] . . .
is not counted as available in determining Medicaid eligibility,” but is 
“subject to the post-eligibility rules.”227
H. Analysis of the Agency Interpretation
In terms of how much deference is properly accorded to the SMM, it 
is important to note that the SMM does not constitute law, bind any court, 
or warrant Chevron deference.228 Instead, agency manuals like the SMM 
are “informal” interpretations229 entitled to Skidmore deference only if they 
are persuasive.230 However, agency interpretations receive no deference if 
they conflict with the text231 or purpose of a statute.232
223. Sai Kwan Wong v. Doar, 571 F.3d 247, 253 n.6 (2d Cir. 2009)
224. SMM, supra note 92, at § (B)(1).
225. Note that because the SMM provisions were not discussed in either Olson or Lewis, agency 
interpretation was not at issue in those cases.
226. SMM, supra note 92, at § 3257(B)(6).
227. SMM, supra note 92, at § 3259.7(C)(5)(b). Note that this portion of the SMM explicitly 
mentions only income SNTs, but the SMM states that it applies to all three SNTs. Id.
228. See Doar, 571 F.3d at 258-59; see also Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) 
(“Interpretations such as those in . . . agency manuals . . . lack the force of law [and] do not warrant 
Chevron-style deference.”). But see Wis. Dep’t. of Health & Family Servs. v. Blumer, 534 U.S. 473, 
496 n.13 (2002)(the Supreme Court has “long noted Congress’ delegation of extremely broad regulato-
ry authority to the Secretary [of the HHS] in the Medicaid area.”).
229. Sai Kwan Wong v. Doar, 571 F.3d 247, 250 (2d Cir. 2009).
230. Gonzales v. Or., 546 U.S. 243, 256 (2006) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 
140 (1944)).
231. See, e.g., Ohio Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 171 (1989) (“[N]o defer-
ence is due to agency interpretations at odds with the plain language of the statute itself.”).
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Here, the SMM’s sole benefit rule correctly follows the statute, but its 
post-eligibility rule does not.233 The SMM’s sole benefit rule is consistent 
with OBRA because § 1396p(d)(4) clearly states that all SNTs must be 
established for the benefit of the individual.234 The SMM’s post-eligibility 
rule, however, conflicts with the text of the statute because § 1396p(d)(1) 
specifically states that the default rule for trusts does not apply when de-
termining an individual’s “eligibility” and “amount of” Medicaid bene-
fits.235 Additionally, since CMS did not explain why it interpreted 
§ 1396p(d) in the way that it did,236 the SMM’s post-eligibility rule might 
not even warrant Skidmore deference.237 As in Ahlborn, courts should “de-
cline to treat [an] agency’s reasoning as controlling” when it shows a “con-
scious disregard for the statutory text.”238 Because the SMM is poorly 
written,239 contains confusing cross-references,240 and has even confused 
astute federal judges,241 state Medicaid agencies should not follow the 
SMM’s post-eligibility rules. Therefore, § 1396p(d)(4) should not be read 
as being optional on the states based on the SMM.
232. Ramey v. Reinertson, 268 F.3d 955, 963 (10th Cir. 2001).
233. Note that the Tenth Circuit in Reames did not rely solely on the SMM and therefore was 
correct in its holding. See Reames v. Okla. ex rel. Okla. Health Care Auth., 411 F.3d 1164, 1172 (10th 
Cir. 2005) (“[W]e cannot ignore the plain language of the [Social Security statute governing payment of 
Social Security benefits], which expressly forbids assignment of Social Security benefits.”).
234. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4)(A), (B), (C)(iii) (2006).
235. § 1396p(d)(1).
236. See Sai Kwan Wong v. Daines, 582 F. Supp. 2d 475, 483 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d sub nom., Sai 
Kwan Wong v. Doar, 571 F.3d 247 (2d Cir. 2009).
237. See, e.g., Detsel v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d 58, 65 (2d Cir. 1990) (Skidmore deference was not 
warranted since the agency “failed to produce any evidence indicating the rationale for [its] interpreta-
tion”), see also Boykin v. Key Corp., 521 F.3d 202, 208 (2d Cir. 2008) (since an agency provided little 
“explanation of the considerations or reasoning underlying its practice” the agency interpretation was 
not entitled to Skidmore deference).
238. Ark. Dep’t. of Health & Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268, 292 (2006).
239. See, e.g., Jacqueline d. Farinella, Note, Come on in, the Water’s Fine: Opening Up the Special 
Needs Pooled Trust to the Eligible Elderly Population, 14 ELDER L.J. 127, 152 (2006) (arguing the 
SMM “inadequately guides” state Medicaid agencies “by listing the criteria of a [pooled SNT] with the 
exact language used in the statute” and “confusingly assert[ing] that establishing a [pooled SNT] ‘may 
or may not constitute a transfer of assets for less than fair market value’”).
240. See, e.g., Reames v. Okla. ex rel. Okla. Health Care Auth., 411 F.3d 1164, 1169 n.4 (10th Cir. 
2005) (noting how the SMM states that the section for pooled SNTs applies to individual SNTs).
241. For example, in Reames, the Tenth Circuit stated, “Oklahoma sets forth its policies for admin-
istering Medicaid benefits in its [SMM].” Id. at 1169. However, as discussed above, the CMS writes the 
SMM, not any state. See SMM, supra note 92.
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I. Conclusion: § 1396p(d)(4) is Best Read as Being Mandatory
Interpreting the Medicaid statute can be difficult due to the some-
times-unclear text and thin legislative history.242 The Second and Tenth 
Circuits, however, were persuaded that § 1396p(d)(4) is optional on the 
states by focusing on the lack of clear language stating that the provision is 
mandatory. However, this argument “ignores the simplest and clearest ex-
planation: that Congress excepted [assets in SNTs] from all eligibility and 
benefits calculations [and therefore] [n]o gap exists” for the states to legis-
late.243 Thus, the most logical interpretation of § 1396p(d)(4) is evidenced 
from the structure and overall purpose of § 1396p(d), and other provisions 
within the Medicaid statute, which show that § 1396p(d)(4) should be 
mandatory on the states.244
In enacting § 1396p(d), Congress had two goals in mind: to prevent 
non-SNTs from abusing Medicaid, and to create a narrow exception for 
SNTs.245 The structure of the statute follows these goals because in 
§ 1396p(d) Congress created a “comprehensive” and “binary system” 
where a person is attempting to use a trust and receive Medicaid.246 First, if 
the person is not using a SNT, then the default rule in § 1396p(d)(3) clearly 
controls and thus, the assets in the trust must be counted when determining 
the person’s Medicaid eligibility. Second, if the person is using a SNT, then 
§ 1396p(d)(1) states that the default rule does not apply and the SNT must 
meet the specific elements listed in § 1396p(d)(4). Both § 1396p(d)(1) and 
(4) also contain mandatory language that place SNTs in a separate category 
from all non-SNTs. Therefore, Congress enacted this binary system to cre-
ate mandatory rules for both non-SNTs and SNTs.
However, to interpret § 1396p(d)(4) as being optional on the states re-
quires disregarding one-half of Congress’ binary system because then states 
may freely create any rule for SNTs. In other words, § 1396p(d)(4) has no 
utility if a state wishes to ignore those provisions. But the Second and 
Tenth Circuits failed to explain why Congress, after meticulously defining 
SNTs, would it leave it up to the states to decide how SNTs are regulated. 
242. See Herweg v. Ray, 455 U.S. 265, 279 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (referring to the 
Medicaid statute as a “morass of bureaucratic complexity”).
243. Sai Kwan Wong v. Daines, 582 F. Supp. 2d 475, 484 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d sub nom., Sai 
Kwan Wong v. Doar, 571 F.3d 247 (2d Cir. 2009). Note that the Second Circuit disagreed with the 
district court’s interpretation and instead accorded Skidmore deference to the SMM because there was 
“ambiguity as to Congress’ intent” in § 1396p(d)(4). Doar, 571 F.3d at 256 n.11.
244. See, e.g., Crandon v. U.S., 494 U.S. 152, 158 (1990) (“In determining the meaning of the 
statute, we look not only to the particular statutory language, but to the design of the statute as a whole 
and to its object and policy.”).
245. Lewis v. Alexander, 685 F.3d 325, 343 (3d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 933 (2013).
246. Id. at 332, 344.
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Instead, to give “full effect to [both] of Congress’ statutory objectives”247
of preventing Medicaid abuse and exempting SNTs from Medicaid deter-
minations, § 1396p(d)(4) should be mandatory on the states.
Besides § 1396p(d)(1) and (4), other provisions within the Medicaid 
statute provide convincing evidence that § 1396p(d)(4) should be mandato-
ry on the states. First, Congress required states to comply with all of 
§ 1396p, including the SNT provisions.248 Second, in § 1396p(d)(5), Con-
gress granted a state discretion to “waive” the rules in § 1396p(d) if an 
individual within the state would suffer an “undue hardship,” but only if the 
state’s waiver procedure is approved by the HHS Secretary.249 This means 
that Congress created an exception to § 1396p(d)(4) but only if it harms the 
individual, not the state—and even then, the state’s waiver is still subject to 
the federal government’s control. Finally, when Congress intended for the 
states to have discretion it used clear, repetitive language—”at the option of 
[a] state”—at least six times within § 1396p to indicate such discretion.250
It makes no sense to say that Congress created an optional rule in 
§ 1396p(d)(4)—couched in mandatory terms—but did not include the same 
discretionary language used repeatedly throughout the same section of the 
statute. In sum, both § 1396p(d) and several other provisions within the 
Medicaid statute strongly support interpreting § 1396p(d)(4) as being man-
datory on the states.
IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Legitimate policy considerations also support the interpretation that 
§ 1396p(d)(4) is best read as being mandatory on the states, including (1) 
protecting those with disabilities, (2) rejecting the states’ “sheltering as-
sets” argument, and (3) interpreting § 1396p(d)(4) uniformly.
A. Beneficiaries with Disabilities
Section 1396p(d)(4) should be mandatory on the states because indi-
viduals with disabilities cannot benefit from SNTs unless the assets in the 
trusts are exempt from Medicaid eligibility and benefit determinations. The 
247. Id. at 343.
248. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(18) (2006).
249. See § 1396p(d)(5).
250. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 15-16, Keith v. Rizzuto, 531 U.S. 960 (2000) (No. 00-
437), 2000 WL 34000749 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(1)(B)(ii), (b)(4)(B), (c)(1)(A), (c)(1)(C)(ii), 
(c)(1)(E)(i)(II), (c)(1)(E)(ii)(II) (2006)).
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Medicaid program was initially created to help those with disabilities.251
The entire purpose for SNTs, however, is to “mitigate the inadequacies of 
government benefit programs” for individuals with disabilities by having 
SNTs pay for their non-medical needs.252 These individuals struggle to pay 
for both their medical and non-medical needs because they often have se-
vere physical and/or cognitive impairments.253 In fact, § 1396p(d)(4) itself 
requires that individuals have a statutorily defined disability or live in a 
nursing home to use the SNTs.254 However, if a state Medicaid agency 
counts assets in a SNT when determining Medicaid eligibility, an individu-
al with a disability residing in that state is presented with a catch-22: either 
receive Medicaid and be prohibited from using SNTs; or use a SNT and 
automatically become ineligible for Medicaid. This ultimatum effectively 
swallows any utility for SNTs because individuals with disabilities cannot 
use SNTs to pay for things that Medicaid will not cover.
Additionally, the Supreme Court has recognized the importance of 
preventing states from excluding individuals otherwise eligible for public 
aid under the Social Security Act. In Townsend v. Swank,255 the Court held 
that a state could not alter eligibility requirements for a federal aid program 
without “congressional authorization . . . clearly evidenced from the Social 
Security Act or its legislative history.”256 Further, the “principle that ac-
cords substantial weight to interpretation of [the] statute” is that “aid be 
furnished ‘to all eligible individuals.’”257 Here, because both the Medicaid 
statute generally and the SNT provisions help individuals with disabilities, 
the states should be prohibited from counting assets in SNTs when making 
Medicaid determinations.
B. The “Sheltering Assets” Argument
One of the biggest arguments for why it has been argued that 
§ 1396p(d)(4) should be optional on the states is the fear that beneficiaries, 
especially those with great wealth, will shelter their assets in SNTs while 
receiving Medicaid benefits.258 However, the Medicaid statute limits this 
251. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2581 (2012) (“Enacted in 
1965, Medicaid offers federal funding to States to assist pregnant women, children, needy families, the 
blind, the elderly, and the disabled in obtaining medical care.”) (emphasis added).
252. Rosenberg, supra note 34, at 94.
253. Id. at 109.
254. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4)(A), (B)(iii), (C) (2012).
255. 404 U.S. 282 (1971).
256. Id. at 286.
257. Id. (quoting King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 333 n.34 (1968)). 
258. Federalism concerns also clearly play a part in these situations. See, e.g., Horne v. Flores, 557 
U.S. 433, 448 (2009) (“Federalism concerns are heightened when . . . [the federal government’s man-
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abuse by requiring that a SNT be used only for the benefit of the benefi-
ciary.259 Additionally, both individual and income SNTs require a payback 
provision where the remaining assets in the SNT must be used to first pay 
back the state for all of its expenditures after the beneficiary’s death.260
This represented a “bargain” between the states and the beneficiaries: the 
beneficiary remains eligible for Medicaid while using the SNT, but the 
state will be paid back before the beneficiary may give any remaining as-
sets to his or her heirs.261 Moreover, while pooled SNTs do not require a 
payback provision, the beneficiary’s heirs will not receive any remaining 
assets in the trust because the state is reimbursed for the amount of medical 
expenses previously paid to the beneficiary except for those “retained by 
the trust.”262 The funds kept by the trust could be used to pay for adminis-
trative costs, given to charity, used to create additional trust accounts for
new beneficiaries, or used to provide additional items and services to the 
existing beneficiaries.263 Finally, a beneficiary must still satisfy a state 
Medicaid lien from the proceeds of a tort settlement against a third party 
before depositing any of the settlement into the SNT.264
Nonetheless, even if individuals try to use SNTs to shelter their assets, 
states have other means to stop the abuse. One tool is to enact a state law 
that limits Medicaid abuse through trusts,265 as Congress did not intend to 
displace state trust law with OBRA.266 In fact, state law, not federal law, 
generally governs the laws surrounding SNTs,267 which developed some-
time during the latter part of the twentieth century.268 States can also peti-
tion Congress to change § 1396p(d) or withdraw from the Medicaid 
program entirely if SNTs continue to abuse their Medicaid programs.269
date] has the effect of dictating state or local budget priorities” because “[s]tates and local governments 
have limited funds.”).
259. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4)(A), (B), (C)(iii) (2006).
260. See § 1396p(d)(4)(A), (B)(ii).
261. Rosenberg, supra note 34, at 131.
262. § 1396p(d)(4)(C)(iv).
263. Rosenberg, supra note 34, at 135. 
264. Sullivan v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 174 F.3d 282, 286 (2d Cir. 1999).
265. However, state laws must not conflict with any federal law. See Lewis v. Alexander, 685 F.3d 
325, 350 (3d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 933 (2013).
266. See id. at 347.
267. Sai Kwan Wong v. Daines, 582 F. Supp. 2d 475, 479 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d sub nom., Sai 
Kwan Wong v. Doar, 571 F.3d 247 (2d Cir. 2009).
268. Rosenberg, supra note 34, at 144.
269. However, states may have difficulty petitioning Congress for change considering the political 
process, and withdrawing from the Medicaid program may be unrealistic given the need for federal 
funding.
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Ultimately, individuals sheltering assets in trusts caused problems for 
state Medicaid agencies and likely will continue to do so.270 SNTs, howev-
er, were not the type of trusts that were abusing the Medicaid system when 
Congress enacted § 1396p(d).271 Furthermore, one commentator has sug-
gested that SNTs could actually save state resources, because when benefi-
ciaries use SNTs to provide for their non-medical needs, they may need 
less publicly funded medical care.272 In sum, because the sheltering assets 
argument fails to account for the legal protections afforded to the states, it 
cannot be used to interpret § 1396p(d)(4) as being optional on the states.
C. A Uniform Interpretation
The circuit split over interpreting § 1396p(d)(4) has created several 
problems.273 However, the split will not be solved soon, as the Supreme 
Court has denied writ of certiorari for Keith,274 Reames,275 and Lewis.276
Because the primary benefit of having one federal statute governing SNTs 
is clarity for all parties,277 § 1396p(d)(4) should be mandatory to make sure 
that jurisdictions do not differ in their interpretation of the provision.278
Section 1396p(d)(4) should be uniformly interpreted to assist as those 
harmed by an inconsistent interpretation. First, the beneficiaries and their 
family members must discover their jurisdiction’s interpretation and their 
state’s laws regarding trusts.279 If a beneficiary’s SNT complies with his or 
her state’s trust laws, then the beneficiary may not bring the SNT to anoth-
er state that either has different laws regarding SNTs or does not exempt 
270. See, e.g., Johnson v. Guhl, 357 F.3d 403, 405 (3d Cir. 2004) (“Because Medicaid is available 
to the needy, creative lawyers and financial planners have devised various ways to ‘shield’ wealthier 
claimants’ assets in determining Medicaid eligibility.”).
271. Radford & Bryan, supra note 8, at 7.
272. See Rosenberg, supra note 34, at 96 n.25. Additionally, an SNT allows an individual with a 
disability who receives a personal injury settlement or verdict to use the SNT to pay for items that 
Medicaid fails to pay for. See id. at 136.
273. See Farinella, supra note 239, at 129 (arguing that “careless drafting [of § 1396p(d)(4)(C)] has 
led to a number of other difficult and even dangerous outcomes, including disparate treatment under 
state law and disparate structures by the managing nonprofit organizations”).
274. Keith v. Rizzuto, 212 F.3d 1190 (10th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 960 (2000).
275. Reames v. Okla. ex rel. Okla. Health Care Auth., 411 F.3d 1164 (10th Cir. 2005), cert. denied,
546 U.S. 1225 (2006).
276. Lewis v. Alexander, 685 F.3d 325 (3d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 933 (2013).
277. Rosenberg, supra note 34, at 123.
278. Note that all three types of SNTs should be treated the same when courts interpret 
§ 1396p(d)(4). See Hobbs ex rel. Hobbs v. Zenderman, 579 F.3d 1171, 1180 n.3 (10th Cir. 2009) (not-
ing that because all SNTs under § 1396p(d)(4) use the “same statutory language” there is no reason to 
treat them differently in terms of their mandatory obligations on the states).
279. See Rosenberg, supra note 34, at 123 (“Some states rely on the common law and ‘generic’
trust statutes to guide the interpretation of SNTs. Other states have enacted specific statutes that govern 
supplemental needs trusts.”).
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SNTs from Medicaid determinations. Second, state Medicaid agencies 
administering the program must discover their federal jurisdiction’s inter-
pretation of § 1396p(d)(4). If the SNT is created in a jurisdiction that has 
not yet ruled on the issue,280 then both the beneficiaries and the state Medi-
caid agencies must spend time, energy, and resources to argue their inter-
pretations of the provision to the federal district courts, and possibly 
through the appeals process. Third, the attorneys drafting the SNTs must 
stay informed of all these developments to best protect their clients’ assets, 
which can be difficult given the complexity of the Medicaid statute and 
regulations,281 and the sheer amount of legal fields in which these attorneys 
must have expertise.282
All parties involved in these issues need a clear and simple rule to fol-
low.283 One can reasonably assume that when Congress expanded the fed-
eral government’s role in regulating SNTs, one of its goals was to create 
uniformity. Therefore, to avoid having the federal circuits differ in their 
interpretations of § 1396p(d)(4), the provision should be mandatory on all 
states.
CONCLUSION
The current circuit split over the relationship between Medicaid and 
supplemental needs trusts threatens the increasing use of SNTs.284 The 
circuits holding that § 1396p(d)(4) is optional on the states have gotten 
“lost in the Medicaid maze” by focusing primarily on its unclear text.285
However, after examining the text of § 1396p(d), and the relevant policy 
considerations, it becomes clear that Congress wanted to exempt assets in 
SNTs from Medicaid determinations. Therefore, § 1396p(d)(4) is best read 
as being mandatory on the states based on the entire forest, not just the 
trees.
280. Currently, only the Second, Third, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have interpreted whether 
§ 1396p(d)(4) is mandatory on the states. 
281. Hobbs, 579 F.3d at 1186.
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limited to, disability law, tax law, long-term investments, Medicaid eligibility and benefits (and poten-
tially SSI issues), trusts and estate law, and liability issues.
283. Additionally, at least one commentator has suggested that Congress amend § 1396p(d)(4)(C) 
to indicate more clearly how pooled SNTs should be administered, and that the CMS should also in-
clude a model pooled SNT in the SMM to guide the states. See Farinella, supra note 239, at 164-65.
284. See Lacey & Nadler, supra note 34, at 247 (“[I]interest in and demand for Special Needs 
Trusts (SNTs) is on the rise.”).
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